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Unpacking the Drivers of Corporate Social Performance: 
A Multilevel, Multistakeholder, and Multimethod Analysis 
 
Abstract 
The question of what drives corporate social performance (CSP) has become a vital concern 
for many managers and researchers of large corporations.  This study addresses this question 
by adopting a multilevel, multistakeholder, and multimethod approach to theorize and 
estimate the relative influence of macro (national business system and country), meso 
(industry), and micro (firm-level) factors on CSP.  Applying three different methods of 
variance decomposition analysis to an international sample of 2,060 large public companies 
over a time span of 5 years, our results show that firm-level factors explain the largest 
proportion of variance in aggregate CSP as well as CSP oriented toward communities, the 
natural environment, and employees.  These results support our hypotheses according to 
which CSP is not primarily driven by macrolevel or mesolevel factors, except for shareholder-
oriented CSP, which is relatively more influenced by country-level factors.  As a whole, our 
findings also point to the value of subdividing CSP into its stakeholder-specific components 
as this disaggregation allows for a more careful examination of distinct drivers of distinct 
aspects of CSP. 
Keywords: Corporate social performance; corporate social responsibility; decomposition of 
variance; hierarchical linear modeling; stakeholders; variance components analysis.   
Abbreviations: ANOVA = analysis of variance; CSP = corporate social performance; HLM 
= hierarchical linear modeling; MLE = maximum likelihood estimation; NBS = national 
business system; REMLE = restricted maximum likelihood estimation; VCA = variance 
components analysis.  
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Unpacking the Drivers of Corporate Social Performance: 
A Multilevel, Multistakeholder, and Multimethod Analysis 
As researchers have established the managerial relevance of corporate social 
responsibility (e.g., Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Porter & Kramer, 2011), the study of the factors 
that drive corporate social performance has become a key concern in business ethics (Brower 
& Mahajan, 2013; Crilly, 2011; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).1  Corporate social performance 
(CSP) can be defined as the measurement of organizational outcomes in the environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) domains with respect to multiple stakeholders, such as 
employees, local communities, or shareholders (Chen & Delmas, 2011; Clarkson, 1995; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003).  Scholars have theorized multiple drivers of CSP at 
industry, country, and national business system levels (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & 
Ganapathi, 2007; Campbell, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2008), and prior empirical research 
attempted to clarify whether and how these macro-level drivers may interact with specific 
firm-level drivers of CSP (Brower & Mahajan, 2013; Crilly, 2011; Udayasankar, 2008).  
Missing from this research stream are two important considerations.  First, although prior 
research has established that CSP drivers operate at the firm, industry, country, or national 
business systems (NBS) levels of analysis, surprisingly little is known about the relative 
influence of these factors (Aguilera et al., 2007) as well as the influence of time as a potential 
driver of CSP.  These omissions are detrimental to knowledge about how CSP can become 
more strategic and, thus, more conducive to higher corporate financial performance (Orlitzky, 
Siegel, & Waldman, 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2006) as well as other important organizational 
outcomes across multiple levels and over time (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012).  At the same time, 
these knowledge gaps limit managers’ understanding of CSP priorities (Smith, 2003), 
especially in corporations that operate across multiple industries, countries, or national 
                                                          
1 Strictly speaking, corporate social responsibility differs from corporate social performance (CSP).  However, 
following previous arguments by Barnett (2007) and Baird and his colleagues (2012), we prefer CSP for 
expositional purposes in this empirical study.  
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business systems. 
Second, despite the centrality of a stakeholder perspective in the theoretical analysis of 
CSP (Carroll, 1991; Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007), prior empirical 
examinations of CSP drivers rarely made distinctions between the different stakeholder 
groups.  Rather, empirical investigations focused on CSP breadth (Brower & Mahajan, 2013), 
examined only aggregate proxies of CSP (e.g., Surroca, Tribo, & Waddock, 2010), or did not 
separately study the different stakeholder foci in CSP (e.g., Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).  As a 
result, our current knowledge of the relative influence of the factors that drive CSP across 
different stakeholder dimensions remains rather limited. 
This study starts addressing these two important limitations.  In regard to the first 
limitation, our analysis can be considered exploratory as there is at present no theory that 
would explain or specify the extent to which the different drivers affect CSP (let alone its 
stakeholder dimensions).  This means that, like seminal studies taking a similar analytic 
approach in strategic management—with a different outcome variable (e.g., Rumelt, 1991), 
our study focuses on the magnitude of effect sizes.2  In general, such a descriptive focus on 
the magnitude of effect sizes has been recommended as methodological best practice (e.g., 
Cumming, 2012; Hunter, 1997; Kline, 2004; Orlitzky, 2012; Schmidt, 1992).  However, most 
researchers currently eschew such an emphasis on effect size magnitude in favor of the binary 
outcomes of null-hypothesis significance tests (Schmidt, 1996; Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). 
In regard to the second limitation, we rely in this study on disaggregated, stakeholder-
focused measures of CSP not only to be consistent with prior theorizing (e.g., Clarkson, 1995; 
Hillman & Keim, 2001), but also to make the findings more operationally meaningful for 
managerial practice, as prior studies have shown that managers and employees perceive CSP 
mainly through a stakeholder lens (El-Akremi, Gond, Swaen, De Roeck, & Igalens, in press; 
                                                          
2 The outcome variable of choice is profitability in strategic management where largely descriptive studies such 
as ours have, for 20 years, been aimed at explaining variance in firm profitability.  
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Lucea, 2010; Turker, 2009).  More specifically, the present study presents analyses for these 
six stakeholder groups separately: customers, local communities, shareholders, suppliers, the 
natural environment, and employees. 
In shedding light on the relative importance of CSP drivers across multiple levels of 
analysis and for multiple stakeholder groups through the application of various methods, this 
study contributes to the literature in three major ways.  First, this study advances stakeholder 
theory by showing that the relative influence of CSP determinants varies according to the 
stakeholder group considered.  Our findings show that the firm level accounts for a lot of 
variability in CSP focused on local communities, the natural environment, and employees, 
whereas macro-level drivers seem more important for shareholder-focused CSP.  Second, we 
address recurrent calls for multilevel analyses (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Aguinis & Glavas, 
2012) in comparing and contrasting the relative importance of three levels of possible sources 
of organizations’ variance in CSP: (a) national business systems (country); (b) industry; (c) 
firm.  We also add to this perspective by considering time (year) as a fourth level, a dimension 
that has often been neglected in prior CSP analyses (Griffin & Mahon, 1997).  Overall, our 
findings point to the primacy of firm-level CSP drivers, but also demonstrate the importance 
of higher levels of analysis by showing that national and supranational factors may, to some 
extent, affect specific stakeholder components of CSP.  Finally, we compare and contrast the 
findings of three analytic techniques (analysis of variance, variance components analysis, and 
hierarchical linear modeling).  As far as we know, this is the first multilevel analysis of CSP 
to compare the effect sizes calculated by each of these techniques across levels of analysis.  
So, similar to Hough’s (2006) study design for return on assets, this study adopts a 
multimethod perspective. 
In the following section, we describe the theoretical background of this study and present 
three hypotheses regarding the importance of levels of analysis for CSP.  To develop these 
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hypotheses, we draw on insights from economics, management, and comparative sociology as 
well as the empirical and theoretical CSP literature.  We then test our hypotheses using the 
SiRi dataset, which allows for the disaggregation of CSP by stakeholder domain.  The third 
section introduces our methods as well as our sample, measures, and sources of data.  The 
fourth section of the paper presents our analyses and results.  Finally, we discuss the 
implications of our findings for theory and practice as well as the limitations of the study and 
potential future research directions. 
A Multilevel Perspective on Corporate Social Performance 
Macrolevel: Country and National Business Systems Factors 
Variations in organizational adoption and implementation of CSP can be explained by a 
wide range of factors operating at different levels of analysis.  First, social macrostructures 
have often been emphasized as key determinants of CSP (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Matten & 
Moon, 2008).  These macrolevel institutions, or national business systems (NBS), capture 
institutional nation-state differences in firms’ macroenvironments (Morgan, 2007), which in 
turn have been found to affect firm decisions, for example in the automobile industry (Biggart 
& Guillén, 1999).  Applied to CSP, distinct national policy frameworks that encourage social 
and/or environmental initiatives may affect organizations' decisions (Spence, 2007; Tantalo & 
Willi, 2012).  Accordingly, the country level and the NBS level have both been theorized as 
likely to explain part of the CSP variation across firms. 
Mesolevel: Industry Factors 
Industry forces have also been proposed as constraints on, or enablers of, CSP (Baird et 
al., 2012; Hull & Rothenberg, 2008; Orlitzky & Shen, 2013).  For example, in industries that 
experience economic downturns, discretionary CSP expenditures may be one of the first 
corporate spending cuts (Campbell, 2007).  Conversely, in highly unionized industry 
environments, labor unions may put a lot of pressure on companies to increase the level of 
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CSP exhibited toward workers and insist on the enforcement of “fair trade” standards, which 
may create trade barriers in a quest to protect blue-collar workers’ jobs from possibly less 
expensive imports (Ederington & Minier, 2003; McWilliams, Van Fleet, & Cory, 2002).  
Hence, mesolevel industry factors are also expected to influence CSP variance across firms. 
Microlevel: Firm-level Factors 
Several authors also theorized that CSP may primarily be determined by firm-level 
actions and variables (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Udayasankar, 2008).  Often, 
organization-level factors constrain firms’ spending on CSP.  For example, organizational 
efforts to increase CSP may increase transaction and other costs (King, 2007), such as 
organizational expenditures associated with identifying partners or stakeholders to be targeted 
by CSP, negotiating with these partners or stakeholders, and monitoring and enforcing 
compliance (e.g., monitoring of suppliers’ compliance with sustainability programs or 
workplace safety).  So, because of the inherent costliness of genuine CSP (Friedman, 1970; 
Orlitzky, 2013; Windsor, 2001), an important precondition for high CSP is the availability of 
slack resources (McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997).  In addition, CSP may be constrained by customers’ reluctance to pay a 
premium for a firm’s socially responsible products (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; Frazier, 2007) 
or investors’ unwillingness to punish irresponsible companies or reward responsible ones 
(Rivoli, 2003). 
The Relative Influence of Factors across Levels 
Although prior theory clearly suggests that each of these three levels of analysis 
(NBS/country, industry, and firm) matters, no empirical evidence has provided numerical 
estimates of these factors’ relative weights and simultaneous impact.  In addition, the time 
dimension has often been neglected in prior studies of CSP (Griffin & Mahon, 1997).  Rather 
than constituting a time-invariant outcome of deterministic firm-, industry-, or country-level 
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influences, CSP may instead represent a highly time-contingent or transient decision process 
(e.g., Wang & Choi, 2013).  For example, recessions may severely limit the level of funding 
available for discretionary social and environmental initiatives as well as determine the 
strategic benefits of CSP (Campbell, 2007; Lee, Singal, & Kang, 2013; McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001).  Coding for year captures this time dimension in the same way as coding for firms 
captures all the different firm-level variables that may affect CSP across all years of our time 
period (Rumelt, 1991, p. 173).  Hence, our overarching research question is aimed at 
addressing these multilevel issues.  Our overall analytic approach, which is summarized in 
Figure 1, can be stated as follows: 
Research Question: To what extent do (1) country-level, (2) industry-level, (3) corporate-
level factors, and (4) time account for the variability of different types of corporate social 
performance? 
(Insert Figure 1 about here.) 
Hence, the focus of the present study is on the relative empirical importance of factors at 
different levels of analysis—a question that cannot be answered from the conventionally 
sizeless and binary hypothesis-testing perspective in the social sciences (Kline, 2004; 
Orlitzky, 2012; Schmidt, 1996; Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008).  The research question implies 
that our perspective is not only descriptive, but also exploratory because so far no theory has 
emerged that would specify the magnitude of effect sizes with respect to the different sources 
of variability in CSP.  Nonetheless, with theoretical guidance from the extant literature, our 
study also goes beyond this descriptive perspective by testing three more specific hypotheses 
as well as a methodological proposition.  
Hypothesis Development 
Macrolevel forces undoubtedly influence CSP (Aguilera et al., 2007; Ioannou & 
Serafeim, 2012) by shaping the regulations and legal standards that exist in each domain of 
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CSP and hence homogenizing the playing field within which firms compete through CSP.  
However, these macroforces are not necessarily homogeneous across CSP stakeholder 
domains because the institutional norms regulating what is regarded as appropriate behavior 
vis-à-vis each stakeholder group vary nationally and globally (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson 
& Deeg, 2008).  We argue here that the effects from these higher levels of analysis will pale 
in comparison to the interfirm variance in CSP that can be attributed to the firm level, except 
in the domain of corporate governance where national legal factors tend to have a prominent 
influence (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).  
Accordingly, we propose that the firm level is the main determinant of almost all stakeholder 
dimensions of CSP, except for shareholders (i.e., corporate governance practices).  We now 
theorize further the reasons behind these differences. 
The Predominance of Firm-Level Factors 
Several arguments suggest that firm-level factors may explain a greater proportion of 
interfirm variance in CSP relative to other levels.  First, CSP is increasingly used strategically 
(McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; Orlitzky et al., 2011) to differentiate the firm from its 
competitors.  In such a strategic approach, firm-specific cost-benefit analyses can be assumed 
to take center stage (A. Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). 
Let’s first consider the cost side.  Implementing CSP is costly because, from an economic 
perspective, high CSP reflects a firm voluntarily internalizing its externalities (Lyon & 
Maxwell, 2008).  Externalities, defined as the results of market transactions that are not 
themselves embodied in such transactions (Coase, 1960; Crouch, 2006), are typically not fully 
reflected in prices and so lead to a divergence of private and social costs (Dahlman, 1979; 
Pigou, 1962).  In other words, CSP refers to nonmarket actions by which firms take 
“ownership of the externalities they generate” (Crouch, 2006, p. 1534).  In addition to the 
direct costs associated with CSP (see also Orlitzky, 2013), companies that are committed to 
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CSP also incur transaction costs (Macher & Richman, 2008), which apply not only to 
social/environmental partnerships, but also to the adoption of any CSP initiative more broadly 
(King, 2007).  These additional costs incurred by organizations high in CSP explain why there 
is often no short-term strategic incentive for individual companies to increase CSP (Campbell, 
2006), especially if intense market competition prevents such an organizational focus on 
social and environmental concerns (Doane, 2005; Reich, 2008; Shleifer, 2004; Vogel, 2005). 
At the same time, economic rents are often appropriable3 from CSP because, in the long 
run, transaction costs and uncertainty can sometimes be reduced by increasing CSP (Hosmer, 
1995; Jones, 1995).  When rents are appropriable by particular organizations with particular 
attributes, firm-level factors are expected to account for most CSP variability.  This study is 
based on the assumption that profit-seeking economic actors will only make costly decisions 
if economic rents are anticipated as a result of those expenditures (Alvarez & Barney, 2004; 
Coase, 1937; A. Mackey et al., 2007; Schoemaker, 1990).   
Second, arguably even more important in explaining variance of CSP at the firm level is 
the fact that, in order to be effective, CSP must be embedded in particular organizational 
cultures (Swanson, 2014).  In creating the proper firm-specific conditions for meaningful, 
value-attuned CSP, the business executive’s mindset becomes highly important: a mindset of 
value discovery transcends legal, economic, or social pressures and is able to “engage 
employees in the quest for social responsibility” (Swanson, 2014, p. 123).  In turn, an 
organization’s culture and climate, emphasizing either compliance or values (Collier & 
Esteban, 2007; Duarte, 2010), exerts a powerful influence over commitment and engagement 
of the entire workforce (Slack, Corlett, & Morris, in press).  Other research suggests 
organizational culture is causally ambiguous, socially complex (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), path-
dependent (Barney, 1991), and often difficult for rivals to imitate, particularly if it forms part 
                                                          
3 The key point here is that managers anticipate appropriate economic rents from increasing CSP—not that these 
economic rents are necessarily forthcoming. Hence, we refer to appropriable rents in this context.   
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of an organization's unique identity orientation in defining its relationships with stakeholders 
(Brickson, 2007).  Therefore, only if social and environmental initiatives converge around a 
set of highly standardized, institutionalized, and therefore relatively homogeneous practices 
(Orlitzky, 2013) can we expect higher-level institutional drivers to outweigh the influence of 
idiosyncratic firm-level influences of CSP.  Based on this theoretical reasoning, our overall 
expectation is that, for most aspects of CSP, firm-level factors account for most CSP 
variability because they either constitute firm-level economic constraints, predetermine the 
strategic/economic opportunities that can be anticipated from CSP, or are deeply, holistically, 
and intangibly embedded in each individual firm’s unique DNA. 
H1: Most of the interfirm variability in CSP overall as well as its disaggregated 
stakeholder-oriented components is attributable to the micro (firm) level. 
The Prevalence of Macrolevel Factors for Shareholder-Oriented CSP 
Nonetheless, for the specific case of shareholder-oriented CSP, we expect variations in 
CSP to be explained more by macrolevel factors than firm-level factors. Three lines of 
argument back this hypothesis.  First, in essence, good corporate governance involves 
organizations satisfying shareholders’ informational, ownership, and other interests that have 
not been sanctioned by regulations or the law yet (Macey, 2008).  For example, business 
executives and directors may decide to forgo pay in favor of organizational reinvestment of 
earnings, stock buybacks, or large dividend payments to shareholders.  Often, prioritizing 
shareholders over other stakeholders (i.e., a strong focus on shareholder-oriented CSP, or 
corporate governance reforms) is triggered not so much by firm-specific events, but by 
higher-level motivations of stock market revitalization or the withdrawal of the state from 
economic activity (i.e., by a countrywide move away from corporatism) (R. E. Meyer & 
Höllerer, 2010).  This is unsurprising as an enhanced focus on shareholders—or firm 
owners—is not necessarily in the best interest of entrenched managers, who make the 
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operational decisions about shareholder-oriented CSP.  In contrast, improvements of many 
other aspects of CSP often have a direct influence on the attitudes and perceptions of 
customers or employees (Bhattacharya, Korschun, & Sen, 2009; El-Akremi et al., in press), 
which can be expected to enhance corporate reputations and thus performance (Fombrun, 
2005).  That is, when executives of large corporations can be assumed to be firmly 
entrenched, only macrolevel forces can be expected to affect differences in shareholder-
oriented CSP.  National governments and NBS may not only regulate or constrain, but also 
enable corporate actions that prioritize the firm owners’ property rights (see also Campbell & 
Lindberg, 1990; Davis, 2005). 
Second, financial theory strongly suggests that differences across countries largely 
account for differences in corporate actions in relation to shareholder management (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; La Porta et al., 2000).  This literature stresses the importance for shareholder 
management of macrolevel factors, such as laws protecting shareholders from expropriation, 
as well as the effectiveness of the enforcement of these laws across countries (for an 
overview, see La Porta et al., 2000).  For instance, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007)  
found that country characteristics accounted for much more variance in firm-level governance 
ratings (ranging from 39% to 73%) than observable firm characteristics (ranging from 4% to 
22%).  If this logic of macrolevel dominance extends not only to core governance practices, 
but also more broadly to firms’ management of their relationships with shareholders in the 
extrafinancial domain, we should expect macrolevel factors, and in particular country-level 
factors, to explain relatively more variation in shareholder-related CSP than in other CSP 
dimensions. 
Third and finally, this expectation is also in line with managers’ instrumental 
considerations.  Although effective governance may ultimately lead to more satisfied 
shareholders, it is costly.  For example, the organizational experience with the Sarbanes-Oxley 
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Act (2002) has shown that (a) governmental regulations may become necessary because 
opportunistic managers are exceedingly reluctant to implement voluntary governance reforms 
that benefit shareholders and (b) the costs of good corporate governance can be very high 
(Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Zhang, 2007).  Other evidence indicates that these costs are 
unlikely to be counterbalanced by improved organizational performance.  More specifically, 
meta-analytic evidence indicates that shareholder-oriented initiatives that are generally 
considered good corporate governance are unlikely to increase stock prices or internal 
efficiency (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998).  In this context we can assume that if 
large net economic benefits existed for shareholder-oriented CSP (which is focused on 
practices of good governance), market signals rather than government regulation would 
already have led to more substantial governance reforms.  However, the lack of financial 
impact of many well-known attributes of “good” corporate governance (Dalton, Daily, Certo, 
& Roengpitya, 2003; Dalton et al., 1998), combined with the anticipation of high managerial 
costs associated with good governance (e.g., transfer of organizational funds and power from 
managers to owners), leads to the expectation of macrolevel (i.e., NBS or country-level) 
forces being the primary driver of this type of CSP. 
H2: For shareholder initiatives, most of the variance in CSP is attributable to the macro 
level (i.e., country and/or NBS factors). 
A Multistakeholder Perspective: Accounting for the Stakeholder-Centric Logic of CSP 
A key theoretical and empirical motivator of this study is a comparison of variance 
decomposition models of CSP centered on a generic and broad responsibility toward society 
(see, e.g., Höllerer, 2013) to other models that reflect a stakeholder-centric logic embedded in 
theorizing by Freeman (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 2007), Aguinis and Glavas 
(2013), Barnett (2007), Jones (1995), Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), and many other 
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scholars.  Clarkson (1995) may have captured our reasoning regarding CSP best when he 
suggested: 
Performance is what counts. Performance can be measured and evaluated.  Whether a 
corporation and its management are motivated by enlightened self-interest, common 
sense, or high standards of ethical behavior cannot be determined by the empirical 
methodologies available today. (Clarkson, 1995, p. 105) 
Furthermore, evaluations of CSP may be based on proxies of stakeholder satisfaction because 
direct, valid measures are very difficult and expensive to obtain (Orlitzky & Swanson, 2012).  
Practically, such a focus on primary stakeholders is necessary because each firm faces its own 
unique set of nonmarket challenges (Clarkson, 1995).  Empirically, this focus is necessary 
because overall ratings of CSP often do not seem to pass the most basic measurement hurdle 
of forming a coherent or robust construct (Orlitzky, 2013), not even within the same 
organization (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006).  Although the construct validity of aggregate 
measures of CSP seems questionable (e.g., Chatterji & Levine, 2006; Entine, 2003; Porter & 
Kramer, 2006), researchers have continued to use them (e.g., Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; 
Surroca et al., 2010).  A more charitable interpretation of the lack of a coherent CSP aggregate 
is the observation that there is no equivalent aggregate of corporate financial performance, 
either.  In fact, the evidence suggests that different dimensions of financial performance are in 
tension with each other (M. W. Meyer & Gupta, 1994), which is one of the reasons why, for 
example, return on assets, return on equity, market share, or Tobin's q are not aggregated to 
capture a corporation’s financial performance in one overall number.  Based on this reasoning 
and previous empirical research (Mattingly & Berman, 2006), we expect large differences 
between variance decompositions for the stakeholder dimensions and those for the aggregate 
scores of CSP. 
H3: The proportions of variance accounted for in decomposition models that examine 
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specific stakeholder dimensions of CSP are expected to differ significantly from those shown 
in models of aggregate CSP. 
A Multimethod Perspective: Three Different Approaches to Variance Decomposition  
Three different analytic techniques of variance decomposition have vigorously been 
debated in the field of strategic management (see, e.g., Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2007; Hough, 2006; McGahan & Porter, 2005; Misangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, & 
LePine, 2006; Ruefli & Wiggins, 2003): analysis of variance (ANOVA), variance components 
analysis (VCA), and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).  To estimate the sources of the 
interfirm variability in CSP, we will compare the results of all three methods, which are 
depicted in Figure 1 as horizontal arrows crossing the different levels of analysis.  Because the 
analytic approaches of ANOVA, VCA, and HLM rely on very different statistical 
assumptions and estimation techniques, we do not expect the findings, regarding estimates of 
interfirm CSP variance explained, to converge across the three different methods.  As this 
assumption is based on not so much organization theory or a theory of business ethics but 
statistical theory instead, we frame it as the following methodological proposition: Estimates 
of the variability in CSP accounted for by the different levels and the different stakeholders 
are significantly different across the three different methodological approaches of ANOVA, 
VCA, and HLM.  
Method 
Sample 
Our sample of 2,060 corporations (with an average firm size of 91,716 full-time 
employees) was drawn from the database compiled by Sustainable Investment Research 
International, or SiRi (now known as Sustainanalytics), which is one of the world’s largest 
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firms specializing in research on CSP.4  At the time of the study, the SiRi dataset was 
compiled by a network of social rating agencies comprising ten independent research 
institutions such as KLD, coordinated from the SiRi headquarters in the Netherlands and 
Canada.  SiRi aimed to assess the CSP of all the largest stock listed companies worldwide, 
aggregating information from various sources, such as company documents and interviews, 
media reports, trade unions, NGOs, and other contacts with stakeholders and managers.  
Similar samples drawn from the SiRi database have also been used in research published in 
other prestigious academic journals (e.g., Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012; Surroca et al., 2010). 
Our study covered the 5-year period of 2003 to 2007.  In other words, we obtained 10,300 
year-observations in total from large public companies headquartered in 21 different 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.  Appendix A presents descriptive statistics about the 
number of firms and their size (in terms of full-time employees) within each country as well 
as NBS cluster of countries.  Our sample is highly representative of the population to which 
we aim to generalize our findings—to the set of very large, public multinational companies 
attracting media attention for their financial, social, and environmental performance. 
Dependent Variables 
We relied on the SiRi database to measure CSP, our dependent variable. SiRi assigns a 
rating between 0 and 100, which represents the extent of each firm’s overall, aggregate CSP 
with respect to customers, local communities, shareholders (i.e., extent of responsible 
corporate governance), suppliers, the natural environment, and employees, respectively.  For 
the empirical comparisons necessitated by our research question, we also used the overall CSP 
                                                          
4 On its website, Sustainalytics defines itself as “an award-winning global responsible investment research firm 
specialized in environmental, social and governance (ESG) research and analysis. The firm offers global 
perspectives and solutions that are underpinned by local expertise, serving both values-based and mainstream 
investors that integrate ESG information and assessments into their investment decisions” (source: Sustainalytics 
website, consulted on the 28/01/2015). 
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score for each firm (see also Surroca et al., 2010 for more details and the suitability of this 
dataset more generally).  Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for each 
stakeholder dimension of CSP.  SiRi offers a truly international cross-industry dataset 
capturing companies' CSP with satisfactory measurement properties.  Appendix B provides 
the main measurement components for each of the six stakeholder dimensions.   
Sources of Variation 
 National business systems (NBS).  To code the NBS where our sample companies are 
headquartered, we relied on the five institutional country clusters of NBS identified by 
Amable (2003).  Amable’s varieties of capitalism framework is grounded in institutional 
economics and political science and supported by considerable empirical evidence (Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008; Morgan, 2007; Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007). Amable’s (2003) extensive and 
detailed statistical analysis of a large set of macroeconomic indicators supported the following 
five clusters of NBS: Market-Based Capitalism, Coordinated Market Economies, Social-
Democratic Economies, Mixed Market Economies (i.e., Amable’s “Mediterranean Varieties 
of Capitalism”), and Asian Collectivist Economies.  This clustering of countries has been 
shown to be robust for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries (Amable, 2003, pp. 171-181).  Amable’s varieties of capitalism were particularly 
suitable for this study for three main reasons.  First, all companies in our sample were 
headquartered in OECD countries and could therefore be categorized according to Amable’s 
framework without any need for additional assumptions about institutional classification.  
Second, Amable’s model is the most applicable macroinstitutional typology of NBS because 
it most closely corresponds to the timeframe of this study: Amable’s (2003) data analyses 
ended in 2002, and our CSP dataset covers the years 2003 to 2007.  Finally, Amable (2003, 
pp. 181-213) established the predictive validity of his NBS framework by examining the 
empirical impact of his NBS clusters on other theoretically related variables, such as partisan 
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politics and specialization of scientific, technological, and  industrial activity (Amable, 2003, 
pp. 181-209).  After a thorough review of the NBS literature, we concluded that Amable’s 
varieties of capitalism model represented a rigorous and empirically validated typology of 
NBS clusters (see also Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Morgan, 2007). 
Industry sectors.  The ten broad sectors of the Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) were used in our coding of industry: energy, materials, industrials, consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, health care, financials, information technology, 
telecommunication services, and utilities.  Statistically significant chi-square statistics 
summarizing the cross-tabulation of companies by industry and NBS suggested the 
importance of including industry sectors in our analytic models. 
Analytic Models 
In general, our analytic model can be formally expressed as:  
𝜂𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛾𝑘 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 ; 
where ηijkt is CSP in NBS i, in industry j, in firm k, during year t. The dependent variable 
ηijkt is a linear combination of the grand mean μ, a NBS effect (α), an industry effect (β), a 
firm effect (γ), a year effect (δ), and an error term (εijkt).  To estimate the sources of variance 
in CSP, three different analytic techniques were used: analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
variance components analysis (VCA), and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM).  Each of these 
data analysis tools comes with its own set of advantages and disadvantages, as briefly 
discussed below. 
ANOVA.  The first analytic technique used in our study was simultaneous ANOVA, 
which relies on an ordinary least squares (OLS) algorithm. Several strategy researchers 
consider this technique to be superior to sequential ANOVA in the context of components-of-
variance analysis (e.g., Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; McGahan & Porter, 2002).  Our OLS 
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calculation of variance components in the unbalanced5 dataset (see also Searle, Casella, & 
McCulloch, 1992) followed Marchenko's (2006) specific methodological advice for Stata™ 
software analyses.  In our analyses, firms were conceptualized as nested within NBS.  Effects 
were entered in the following sequence: year, industry, NBS, and firm. 
VCA.  This technique addresses the major weakness of ANOVA; in ANOVA the results 
are affected by entry order of categories (Bowman & Helfat, 2001; Brush, Bromiley, & 
Hendrickx, 1999)—a weakness that even applies to simultaneous ANOVA (Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2007, p. 780).  The statistical assumptions behind random-effects VCA are 
described in further detail in Searle et al. (1992) and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012).  In 
all random-effects VCA, an important precondition for computability is that the underlying 
probability distribution of the data is assumed to be normal.  The two methods of VCA 
estimation are maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation (REMLE).  The difference is that MLE provides estimates of fixed effects, whereas 
REMLE does not.  In other words, REMLE overcomes the weakness of ML estimation of 
disregarding the degrees of freedom used for estimating fixed effects, that is, of neither being 
minimum variance nor unbiased (in contrast to ANOVA estimates).  For unbalanced data (like 
ours), statistical experts consider both MLE and REMLE VCA to be superior to the ANOVA 
method (Searle et al., 1992, p. 254).  However, because of the tendency of VCA to produce 
unstable results (Brush & Bromiley, 1997), many strategy researchers still prefer ANOVA to 
VCA (Misangyi et al., 2006, p. 573).  In line with our methodological proposition, we decided 
to report both. 
HLM.  Most recently, strategy researchers argued that hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM), also known as multilevel modeling, was the best method for examining multilevel 
effects (Hough, 2006; Misangyi et al., 2006).  Specifically, HLM is generally considered 
                                                          
5 The dataset was unbalanced because the number of firms in each NBS varied (see Appendix A).  
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superior to VCA and ANOVA because HLM (a) permits complex error structures and can 
thus model dependence between levels of analysis, (b) has greater statistical power than the 
other two methods, and (c) addresses the problem of collinearity between corporations and 
industries (Hough, 2006).6  In other words, HLM specifies within-unit factors most accurately 
in longitudinal datasets (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012).  HLM, however, is not the only 
method we reported because, first, ANOVA and VCA have a much longer methodological 
tradition than HLM in the business literature and, second and most important, our 
methodological proposition aims to compare the results of our multimethod calculations.  This 
helps us determine whether the findings across the three different techniques are 
commensurate. In sum, we believe that a descriptive study like ours, focused on estimating 
the proportion of CSP variance accounted for by the various levels of influence, can benefit 
from this methodological pluralism.  
To test our hypotheses, we adapted Crossland and Hambrick’s (2007) conservative 
significance testing procedure (see also Bobko, 2001).  First, the partial R2s were converted 
into partial r correlation coefficients (by taking the square root).  Then, the rs were compared 
via Steiger's (1980) Z, which is a simplified version of Dunn and Clark's (1969, 1971) test 
proposed for overlapping samples (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988).  We concluded that 
H1 or H2 was supported if the relevant difference between the hypothesized dominant (or 
highest) and second-highest category in each variance decomposition model was statistically 
significant at an alpha probability (p) level of .01 or lower.  H3 and the methodological 
proposition involved multiple comparisons between parts of our correlation matrices or entire 
matrices and, thus, were assessed via overall χ2 tests of difference or fit.  For the assessment 
of H3 and the methodological proposition, we followed the statistical procedures described by 
Steiger (1980).   
                                                          
6 For follow-up studies, HLM would also have the advantage of allowing for the inclusion of continuous—rather 
than only dummy/categorical—variables (Misangyi et al., 2006). 
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Results 
Table 1 reports means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for the year 2005 
(unless stated otherwise), the midpoint of our study timeframe.  We estimated the reliability of 
the dependent variables by calculating the internal consistency (i.e., Cronbach's alpha) of the 
SiRi measurement items used for each CSP stakeholder dimension.  The items per dimension 
ranged from 16 (for customer initiatives) to 37 items (for employee CSP).  The calculated 
alpha reliability estimates of .77, .81, .83, .85, .76, and .86 for customer, community, 
shareholder, employee, supplier, and environmental CSP, respectively, were satisfactory.  In 
addition, the statistically significant positive correlations between the six stakeholder 
dimensions can, at a minimum, be interpreted as generally satisfactory coefficients of 
generalizability (Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001; Traub, 1994).  Consistent with other studies 
(Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009; Sharfman, 1996), the significantly positive correlations in 
the lower right-hand corner of Table 1 can be interpreted as indicative of the concurrent 
validity of the CSP proxies.     
(Insert Table 1 about here.) 
In the reporting of results, we will first discuss the descriptive findings with respect to our 
overarching research question, which focused on effect size magnitudes (i.e., proportion of 
variance explained by multiple levels of influence).  Then, we will summarize the results of 
our hypothesis tests. 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Variance Components Analysis (VCA) 
Table 2, which presents the ANOVA and VCA results, indicates that the firm level 
explained between 36% and 75% of the variance in our SiRi dataset.  Particularly for overall 
CSP, the firm level tended to explain a very large proportion of variance, if not the largest 
variance, of all dependent variables considered in this study.  In general, NBS and industry 
membership explained a much smaller proportion of variance in the dependent variables—
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with only one exception to this general rule:  NBS were clearly the second-most important 
determinant of CSP protecting shareholder interests (i.e., good corporate governance), 
explaining between 21% and 27% of variance, depending on the specific statistical method 
used. In contrast, for socially responsible supply-chain initiatives, year-to-year changes 
appeared to be the second-most important antecedent, explaining between 22% and 30% of 
variance of supplier-focused CSP.  Other than that, annual changes (between 2003 and 2007) 
accounted for only a negligible fraction of CSP variance. 
(Insert Table 2 about here.) 
To check the robustness of these conclusions about the predominant attribution of CSP 
variation to between-firm differences, we repeated our calculations for each firm 
headquarters’ country location (instead of NBS), leaving all other data points unchanged.  
Table 3 shows that overall the firm level remained the predominant factor—with one 
exception: when either MLE VCA or REMLE VCA was applied, country became the most 
important antecedent of shareholder-focused CSP (i.e., scores reflecting good corporate 
governance), explaining 41% to 43% of its variance.  The comparison of Tables 2 and 3 
indicates that country generally explained more variance than NBS.  Country location of firm 
headquarters also seems to have been quite important for employee-focused CSP, explaining 
about 22% of its variance in the context of MLE or REMLE VCA.  Industry membership and 
temporal change were found to be relatively unimportant—with supplier-oriented CSP the 
only exception again (for year-to-year changes).  
(Insert Table 3 about here.) 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) 
In our HLM specification, we explicitly modeled the interaction, or covariance, between 
firms and industries.  That is, this covariance across two different levels of analysis was not 
assumed to be zero as in VCA.  Many researchers regard REMLE as superior to MLE 
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because, for balanced data, REMLE produces solutions identical to ANOVA, which has 
optimal minimum variance properties (Searle et al., 1992, p. 255).  Therefore, Table 4 only 
presents the REMLE results.7  Our REMLE HLM findings suggest that, again, most variance 
in CSP (across the six stakeholder dimensions) is mostly attributable to between-firm 
differences rather than NBS or industry variation.  In general, the firm effects exceeded NBS 
effects and industry effects by factors of 2:1 to 67:1, and 3:1 to 47:1, respectively.  Even 
larger than these differences in the six stakeholder dimensions were the differences between 
firm-level effects and NBS effects, and between firm-level effects and industry effects, for 
overall CSP.  Substituting country for NBS effects reduced the proportion of CSP variance 
explained by firm effects by 13% on average.  Country effects, on the other hand, accounted 
for 7% to 39% of variance in the dependent variables.  In fact, the latter percentage exceeded 
variance attributed to firm effects by 9 percentage points in the case of shareholder-focused 
CSP (i.e., 39% vs. 30% for variance in good corporate governance as rated by SiRi).  Country 
effects, which also seemed to be quite important for employee-focused CSP (21%), were 
consistently more important than industry effects.  Country-level effects also were generally 
more important than temporal effects (with the exception of supplier-oriented and customer-
focused CSP).  In the HLM, firm effects generally exceeded country effects by factors of 2:1 
to 7:1—with, as already noted before in the interpretation of the VCA results, shareholder-
focused CSP as the only exception.  
(Insert Table 4 about here.) 
Hypothesis Tests 
Out of 56 possible tests of H1 (14 tests for ANOVA results plus 28 tests for VCA plus 14 
tests for HLM), 53 came out statistically significant at probability level p < .01, consistently 
supporting the hypothesis that most of the variance in CSP overall and its stakeholder-
                                                          
7 The MLE HLM results were very similar to the findings obtained from the REMLE HLM. 
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oriented components is attributable to the firm level.  That is, whenever the firm level 
explained most variance, it explained significantly more variance than the second-highest 
component, which differed from one stakeholder group to another (see Tables 2-4).  Notable 
exceptions were both VCAs shown in Table 3 and one of the HLMs shown in Table 4, where 
the country level of influence, in line with our second hypothesis, accounted for the greatest 
proportion in shareholder-oriented CSP (at p<.01). 
Overall, H2, which predicted that, for shareholder initiatives, most of the variance in CSP 
could be attributed to the country level (national business systems), did not receive the same 
level of empirical support as H1.  Out of eight possible tests (two tests for the ANOVA tables 
plus four tests for VCA plus two tests for HLM), the country level explained (at p<.01) the 
highest percentage of CSP variability in three models—the two country-level specifications of 
VCA (see Table 3) and the country-level specification of HLM (see Table 4).  H2 was not 
supported, however, when a NBS specification of each variance decomposition model was 
used.  That is, in the other five specifications, the firm level remained the predominant factor 
explaining specific stakeholder dimensions of CSP variance (see discussion of H1).   
H3 proposed that the proportions of variance accounted for in decomposition models 
based on a stakeholder logic differed significantly from those shown in models of aggregate 
CSP.  The critical χ2 value (α = .01) was 13.28 for the ANOVA and VCA comparisons, and 
11.34 for the HLM comparisons.  All calculated χ2 statistics used for the comparisons to test 
H3 were statistically significant (p<.01) for all stakeholder groups, except for two: the model 
comparison between environmental CSP and aggregate CSP in the MLE VCA (with country 
as highest level) had a χ2 of only 12.33; and the model comparison between community-
oriented CSP and aggregate CSP in the HLM (with NBS as the highest level) had a χ2 of only 
9.97.  These findings imply that the disaggregation of CSP is important for all stakeholder 
groups except for the natural environment and local communities (at least sometimes).  In 
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other words, for most stakeholder groups, capturing CSP only at the aggregate level will not 
allow for a proper decomposition of its variance. 
Finally, the methodological comparisons of matrices implied by the final, methodological 
proposition all came out statistically significant.  The smallest χ2 was 179.78, for the 
comparison between the country-based REMLE VCA and the corresponding country-based 
HLM.  However, the critical χ2 value for this comparison was 34.81 (α = .01; df = 18).  All 
other calculated χ2 for all other comparisons of matrices (after converting r into z scores) 
exceeded their critical thresholds as well.  This means that the method used for decomposing 
variance of a focal variable does make a substantive difference; the methods of ANOVA 
versus VCA versus HLM are not interchangeable.  This finding is consistent with the 
conclusions of the methods literature on variance decomposition in strategic management.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, this methodological difference has never been 
demonstrated empirically or presented in as much statistical detail as in this study. 
Discussion 
To the extent that the SiRi measures reflect CSP accurately, this study suggests that firm-
level drivers account for the greatest proportion of not only CSP overall, but also most of its 
stakeholder-specific dimensions.  Our findings indicate that firm-level factors are especially 
important for CSP targeted at local communities, the natural environment, and employees, 
whereas broader institutional influences (country-level effects or NBS) sometimes seem to be 
more important for shareholder-oriented CSP.  The three multilevel analyses show that, in 
support of H1, the firm level accounts for the largest proportion of variance in CSP across five 
of the six stakeholder dimensions.  More specifically, in the ANOVA and VCA results, the 
firm level consistently seems to have the largest impact on social and environmental 
initiatives, explaining between 36% and 75% of variance of CSP stakeholder dimensions.  
These firm effects seem to be particularly large for overall CSP and for CSP targeted at local 
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communities, the natural environment, and employees.  The relatively large influence of firm-
level factors suggests that, given particular corporate attributes, firms are able to choose 
particular CSP initiatives proactively and strategically.  Instead of higher-level environmental 
forces structuring corporate decisions, there seems to be considerable leeway for economic 
agency independent of these higher level factors (Child, 1997; Oliver, 1991); otherwise, the 
firm level would explain only a much smaller proportion of the CSP variance.  These results 
are also consistent with arguments in favor of the alignment of strategy with CSP (Orlitzky et 
al., 2011; Porter & Kramer, 2011). 
Interestingly, the one exception to this general finding about the importance of firm-level 
effects is shareholder-focused CSP, in which country effects predominated in the VCA and 
HLM analyses.  Interestingly, our findings suggest good (or poor) corporate governance is 
systemic—much more so than the other stakeholder dimensions of CSP.  The national-level 
drivers of shareholder-focused CSP (“good corporate governance”) clearly warrant further 
theorizing and empirical study.  One possible interpretation of these findings is that when a 
country has strong institutions in place to protect a particular stakeholder group, firm-level 
agency (for better or worse) will become more limited.8  Furthermore, our findings also 
underscore the appropriateness of the decision made by many researchers to exclude 
shareholder-oriented CSP from overall CSP deliberately (e.g., Chin, Hambrick, & Treviño, 
2013; Di Giuli & Kostovetsky, 2014; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Surroca et al., 2010).  From the 
viewpoint of stakeholder theory, this common practice of omitting analyses of shareholder 
concerns is puzzling (Freeman, 1984, 1994; J. Mackey, 2005); however, based on the 
empirical findings of this study, it seems empirically justified after all because the antecedents 
of shareholder-oriented CSP seem to come from very different levels than those of all other 
CSP dimensions.     
                                                          
8 We are grateful to one of the reviewers for this interpretation.  In line with this reviewer's feedback, the results 
may simply indicate that the domain of shareholder CSP is more institutionalized in the countries studied, and 
therefore firm agency is more limited here than in other CSP domains for this sample of firm-year observations.   
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Furthermore, the findings allude to the persistence of differences in nation-states and/or 
business systems—despite the forces of globalization (Gond, Kang, & Moon, 2011; Matten & 
Moon, 2008).  If there were a global convergence toward an Anglo-American model of 
shareholder capitalism, for instance, countries’ lack of variability would be reflected in small 
NBS or country effects.  However, because NBS or country effects explained up to 43% of 
the variability in CSP (in VCA and HLM), this study provides some evidence supporting the 
view that NBS still diverge.  Only with respect to CSP targeted at suppliers, local 
communities, and employees did NBS seem to explain only a negligible amount of variance 
in CSP.  As a final observation about the macro (institutional) level, the fact that country 
effects were generally found to be larger than NBS effects indicates that, contrary to the 
arguments by Amable (2003), clusters of institutional similarities may be a level of conceptual 
abstraction that is indeed a bit too high. 
Overall, a firm’s main industry sector seems to have only a minor effect on CSP across 
the six stakeholder dimensions.  Industry effects were largest for environmental CSP (varying 
between 5% and 13%, depending on the analytic technique used) and CSP shown toward 
local communities (varying between 5% and 10%).  In contrast, industry differences seem to 
matter the least for shareholder-focused CSP and customer-focused CSP.  This suggests that 
industry self-regulation is not observed to be a driver of changes in governance- or customer-
related aspects of CSP (see also King & Lenox, 2000, on the (in)effectiveness of industry self-
regulation in the environmental arena).  Generally, industry differences do not seem a major 
explanation of the variability in CSP and most of its stakeholder dimensions. 
The fact that, for different aspects of CSP, we find at least some variation in the relative 
importance of NBS, country, industry, and firm effects indicates the usefulness of 
disaggregating CSP into its various stakeholder group dimensions. The findings summarized 
in Tables 2-4 consistently show that differences in sources of CSP would be overlooked if 
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CSP were only calculated at an aggregate level, rather than for each stakeholder dimension 
separately.  In support of theorizing by Clarkson (1995) and our introduction of H3, CSP may 
best be discussed as corporate stakeholder performance.  In other words, different corporate 
stakeholder responsibilities seem to require different explanations at different levels of 
analysis and should therefore be theorized as distinct outcomes.  In this context, it should also 
be noted that the reliability of overall CSP (.73) was lower than the reliability coefficients of 
the stakeholder components of CSP.  Lower reliability coefficients are synonymous with 
larger measurement errors and more noise (Orlitzky, 2013; Orlitzky & Swanson, 2012).  
Thus, the breakdown of CSP into its stakeholder components may also be beneficial for the 
interpretation of empirical results.  This result is aligned with psychometric findings about 
employees’ perceptions of CSR, showing the relevance of a multistakeholder perspective to 
CSR assessment (El-Akremi et al., in press; Turker, 2009).  Our study suggests the construct 
of corporate stakeholder performance may be a helpful complement to CSP.   
Practical Implications for Managers and Policy-Makers 
For effective organizational and public policy decisions about CSP, managers need to 
know the main sources of interfirm differences in CSP.  The results of this study imply that by 
far the most important source of corporate differences in CSP is due to firm-specific assets, 
resources, and mindsets rather than headquarters location, membership in an industry, or year-
to-year adjustments to external pressures.  Put differently, firms within a given industry differ 
from one another a great deal more than industries or countries do in terms of CSP.  So, in 
some ways, our findings challenge the importance of institutional and industry-level drivers of 
CSP that has been highlighted in previous theory and empirical research (e.g., Campbell, 
2006, 2007; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012).  Viewed from an empirical decomposition-of-
variance perspective, firm-level microfactors should be emphasized more in managerial 
decision-making than these meso- and macrolevel influences.    
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In a practical context, estimating the relative importance can provide guidance on the 
levels of analysis that may be most instrumental for making effective (including strategic) 
decisions about CSP.  Because generally industry-level effects are small, managers making 
decisions about CSP initiatives, such as CSR or sustainability directors, may spend their time 
more productively on creating highly integrated, firm-specific configurations of CSP activities 
rather than mimicking broad industry standards or trends in CSP (see also Orlitzky, 2013).  
The same caveat applies to emulating countrywide trends in CSP because our findings suggest 
(with the caveats mentioned in the next section) that these nation-state forces, in general, do 
not seem to be the main levers for improving CSP.  The one exception that public policy-
makers ought to keep in mind is the greater importance of country effects for corporate 
governance than any other dimension of CSP.  Thus, our findings allude to the possibility that 
government may ultimately be the most appropriate regulator of shareholder-related CSP, 
prioritizing the firm owners’ interests over managerial self-interest and entrenchment. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Like all studies, this one has several weaknesses, which could be addressed in future 
research.  First, the findings are limited to our particular dataset (SiRi), whose usefulness and 
measurement advantages, however, have also been highlighted in a study by Surroca, Tribó, 
and Waddock (2010).  In future, researchers could analyze other CSP datasets to validate our 
findings.  For example, cross-validation is required with a sample of smaller, privately held 
firms because, as Table 1 shows, the average organizational size in our SiRi was large—
approximately 92,000 employees per firm.  More important, though, may be the possibility 
that the type of CSP measure used in this study—even when decomposed into its stakeholder 
components—is affected by significant biases, conflicts of interest, or validity concerns (e.g., 
Carroll, 2000; Chelli & Gendron, 2013; Graafland, Eijffinger, & SmidJohan, 2004; Igalens & 
Gond, 2005; Liston-Heyes & Ceton, 2009; Orlitzky, 2013), so that alternatives (see, e.g., 
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Chen & Delmas, 2011; Orlitzky & Swanson, 2012; Turker, 2009) should be explored in 
future.9 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that, in general, studies like this one are unable 
to answer questions about the ultimate drivers of CSP.  Future studies could, for example, 
measure specific CEO or top management team characteristics and use several different 
lagged designs (with greater attention to intertemporal effects, i.e., year-to-year variation δ in 
the analytic model) to clarify causal effects.  Although HLM is able to examine causal 
relationships (Hough, 2006), ANOVA and VCA are purely descriptive (McGahan & Porter, 
2005; Rumelt, 1991).  In terms of causality, many higher-level effects are very likely to be 
driven by managerial actions (McGahan & Porter, 2005, pp. 875-876; Ruefli & Wiggins, 
2003, pp. 864-865).  Conversely, firm effects cannot unambiguously be attributed to 
managerial actions. 
Finally, future HLM research could transcend the limitation of our study to categorical 
effects (dummy variable coding) and investigate the impact of specific continuous variables 
on CSP.  Such a focus on continuous variables could determine, across different levels of 
analysis, what specific variables cause firms to increase or decrease their CSP.  Other 
researchers (e.g., Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012) have already taken an important step in this 
direction—albeit not from the perspective of corporate stakeholder performance. As indicated 
by our own supplementary analyses10, the most important antecedents of CSP at the firm level 
may include companies’ international scope, firm size, and intangible assets. 
Conclusion 
This study adopted a multilevel, multistakeholder, and multimethod approach to examine 
and unpack the relative influence of CSP drivers at different levels of analysis.  More 
specifically, it applied to the CSP arena three statistical modeling techniques, which have been 
                                                          
9 We are grateful to one of the reviewers for these points.  
10 These supplementary analyses are omitted from this paper, but available in another working paper available 
from the authors. 
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widely used in the strategic management literature to analyze the sources of variability in 
financial performance.  Comparing and contrasting the empirical importance of (a) 
institutional/country-level (macro) effects, (b) industry (meso) effects, (c) firm-level (micro) 
effects, and (d) time effects by drawing on three distinct statistical techniques, we generally 
establish the primacy of firm-level factors.  Macrolevel factors seem to exert a primary 
influence on only one of our investigated CSP dimensions, namely shareholder-oriented 
CSP—and even then only in the context of one specific technique of variance decomposition 
analysis.  In addition, we showed that the relative impact of the determinants of CSP varied 
greatly depending on the stakeholder initiative considered.  Specifically, firm-level drivers 
seemed to be the most important determinants of CSP for local communities, the natural 
environment, and employees as well as a firm’s overall CSP.  Thus, future cross-cultural 
research of CSP ought to examine not only aggregate CSP, but also distinct stakeholder 
groups.  Overall, the findings of our study can be interpreted as preliminary evidence that the 
choice of an organization’s most effective level of CSP is highly firm-specific, stakeholder-
specific, and probably closely intertwined with the firm’s strategy, identity, and culture.   
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Average org. size 2003-2007 
(log-transformed) 
11.43 1.46         
2. Customer-oriented CSP 61.93 15.30 -.06 (.77)       
3. Community-oriented CSP 51.91 16.43 .23* .20* (.81)      
4. Shareholder-oriented CSP 66.52 11.97 .06 .03 .34* (.83)     
5. Employee-oriented CSP 49.77 13.08 .19* .18* .51* .31* (.85)    
6. Supplier-oriented CSP 52.11 14.32 .27* .15 .41* .30* .38* (.76)   
7. Environmental CSP 44.26 13.98 .26* .33* .49* .19* .46* .39* (.86)  
8. Overall CSP (average) 54.38 10.61 .14* .50* .77* .52* .72* .67* .73* (.73) 
Note.    n = 2,060.  *p<.01. 
Numbers in parentheses along the diagonal are reliability estimates (coefficient alpha).  All reliability estimates  
are statistically significant at p<.01.  
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TABLE 2 
ANOVA and Variance Components Analysis 
 
 
 Simultaneous ANOVA 
 
MLE VCA REMLE VCA 
DV: Disaggregated and Overall CSP 
 
NBS 
(α) 
Industry 
(β) 
Firm 
(γ) 
Year 
(δ) 
NBS 
(α) 
Industry 
(β) 
Firm 
(γ) 
Year 
(δ) 
NBS 
(α) 
Industry 
(β) 
Firm 
(γ) 
Year 
(δ) 
Customer-oriented CSP 
 
5% 3% 57% 5% 5% 5% 51% 7% 7% 5% 50% 8% 
Community-oriented CSP 
 
2% 5% 73% 4% 1% 10% 65% 1% 1% 10% 64% 1% 
Shareholder-oriented CSP 
 
21% 1% 48% <.5% 22% 2% 38% 3% 27% 2% 36% 4% 
Supplier-oriented CSP 
 
2% 3% 47% 22% 4% 7% 47% 25% 6% 7% 46% 30% 
Environmental CSP 
 
5% 6% 70% <.5% 6% 10% 61% 2% 7% 10% 60% 3% 
Employee-oriented CSP 
 
2% 5% 70% 2% 4% 7% 61% 1% 5% 7% 60% 2% 
Overall CSP 
 
<.5% 5% 75% 9% <.5% 7% 73% 2% <.5% 7% 74% 2% 
 
Note.   DV = dependent variable.  CSP = corporate social performance. NBS = national business systems.  ANOVA = analysis of variance.  VCA = Variance 
components analysis. MLE = Maximum likelihood estimation. REMLE = Restricted maximum likelihood estimation.  
<.5% means that percentage of variance explained is between 0.001% and 0.499%.  
Percentages pertaining to residual variances are not reported because they are superfluous; the four columns of each type of analysis plus the residual add up to 
100%.  
 
  
Unpacking  40 
 
TABLE 3 
ANOVA and Variance Components Analysis 
(Robustness Check: Countries rather than National Business Systems) 
 
 
 Simultaneous ANOVA 
 
ML VCA REML VCA 
DV: Disaggregated and Overall CSP 
 
Country Industry Firm Year Country Industry Firm Year Country Industry Firm Year 
Customer-oriented CSP 
 
1% 3% 54% 5% 8% 6% 47% 7% 9% 6% 47% 8% 
Community-oriented CSP 
 
1% 5% 63% 4% 9% 9% 57% 1% 10% 9% 57% 1% 
Shareholder-oriented CSP 
 
2% 1% 37% <.5% 41% 1% 25% 3% 43% 1% 24% 4% 
Supplier-oriented CSP 
 
1% 3% 42% 22% 9% 9% 40% 25% 10% 9% 40% 30% 
Environmental CSP 
 
1% 5% 59% <.5% 13% 10% 53% 2% 14% 10% 52% 3% 
Employee-oriented CSP 
 
2% 4% 57% 2% 22% 5% 48% 1% 22% 5% 47% 2% 
Overall CSP  
 
2% 4% 59% 8% 17% 8% 55% 2% 18% 8% 55% 2% 
 
Note.  DV = dependent variable.  CSP = corporate social performance. NBS = national business systems.  ANOVA = analysis of variance.  VCA = Variance 
components analysis. MLE = Maximum likelihood estimation. REMLE = Restricted maximum likelihood estimation. 
<.5% means that percentage of variance explained is between 0.001% and 0.49%.  
Percentages pertaining to residual variances are not reported because they are superfluous; the four columns of each type of analysis plus the residual 
variances add up to 100%.   
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TABLE 4 
Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM)  
Using Restricted Maximum-Likelihood Estimation (REMLE) 
 
 
 With National Business Systems Country instead of NBS 
DV: DV: Disaggregated and Overall 
CSP 
 
NBS 
(α) 
Industry 
(β) 
Firm 
(γ) 
Year 
(δ) 
Cov(Firm*industry)  Country Industry Firm Year Cov(Firm*industry) 
Customer-oriented CSP 
 
6% 4% 55% 8% -7.34 7% 5% 55% 8% -10.36 
Community-oriented CSP 
 
1% 9% 67% 1% -3.33 9% 8% 60% 1% -2.75 
Shareholder-oriented CSP 
 
22% 1% 47% 4% -7.05 39% 1% 30% 4% -2.99 
Supplier-oriented CSP 
 
5% 7% 51% 30% -3.10 8% 8% 50% 30% -5.81 
Environmental CSP 
 
11% 13% 44% 3% 7.47 19% 12% 39% 3% 5.52 
Employee-oriented CSP 
 
5% 7% 61% 2% -.53 21% 4% 49% 2% -.87 
Overall CSP 
 
<.5% 8% 70% 2% .99 19% 8% 54% 2% .02 
Note.  DV = dependent variable.  CSP = corporate social performance. NBS = national business systems.   
<.5% means that percentage of variance explained is between 0.001% and 0.49%. 
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FIGURE 1 
Overview of Study 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Size (n) and Firm Size Across and Within NBS Clusters 
 
Varieties of Capitalism Cluster n Average Corporate Size  
(number of employees) 
Market-Based Economies:   
Australia 81 32,042 
Canada 101 3,213 
United Kingdom 177 39,551 
USA 617 181,158 
Total:  976 124,687 
Coordinated Market Economies:   
Austria 13 13,066 
Belgium 25 16,800 
France 87 95,614 
Germany 95 113,229 
Ireland 13 21,298 
Netherlands 59 38,035 
Norway 22 25,244 
Switzerland 175 103,366 
Total:  489 83,498 
Social-Democratic Economies:   
Denmark 21 14,975 
Finland 19 25,796 
Sweden 39 38,781 
Total:  79 29,330 
Mixed Market Economies:   
Greece 15 11,670 
Italy 52 17,334 
Portugal 12 9,110 
Spain 47 46,939 
Total:  126 26,920 
Asian Collectivist Economies:   
Japan 387 52,865 
South Korea 3 80,594 
Total:  390 53,078 
Overall total sample size and average 
org. size:  
2,060 91,716 
NBS = national business system.   
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APPENDIX B 
Description and Main Components of SiRi's CSR Ratings  
 
Aspect of CSP Description Main Components 
Customer-
focused CSP 
This theme provides an overview of the company’s 
commitment towards maintaining a high quality of 
products and services, reaching high levels of customer 
satisfaction, and adhering to ethical marketing practices. It 
looks at elements such as quality management systems, 
customer relations procedures, and the nature of a firm's 
marketing activities. Attention is paid to controversies 
that are frequently identified in an area as sensitive to 
customer relations: fraudulent, deceptive or controversial 
marketing practices as well as price fixing or antitrust 
violations. 
 Quality of management 
systems 
 Customer satisfaction 
 Competitive practices 
 Marketing practices 
Community-
focused CSP 
Refers primarily to the residents of local communities in 
which a company operates. It may also refer to the larger 
areas, such as a region or nation, to the extent that society 
in such larger areas is affected by a company’s operations.  
It examines to what extent the company takes into account 
the needs, interests, and rights of communities affected by 
its operations or planned operations. It pays specific 
attention to the ways the company seeks to mitigate its 
negative impact on communities and enhance its positive 
impact. 
 Stakeholder consultation 
processes 
 Contribution to the 
development of local 
communities  
 Philanthropic activities 
 Lobbying activities 
 Involvement in non-
democratic countries 
Shareholder-
focused CSP 
(good 
corporate 
governance) 
Primarily assesses the organization of the Board of 
Directors and examines issues such the independency of 
directors and the existence and composition of Board-
specific committees as well as other aspects of good 
corporate governance, such as transparency, stock 
ownership structure, voting rights, and compensation paid 
to senior executives. 
 Independence of directors 
 Audit committee 
 Compensation and 
remuneration schemes 
 Voting rights 
 Anti-takeover devices 
Supplier-
focused CSP 
Refers to the employees of the company’s contractors. It 
provides an overview of the company’s commitment 
towards worldwide fair labor standards and freedom of 
association. The evaluation process examines whether the 
company implemented a code of conduct that addresses 
human and labor rights issues relevant to its operations in 
countries with poor human rights records, and whether it 
implemented the mechanisms to ensure compliance with 
this code. Controversies include, for example, a 
company’s complicity in human rights violations, when it 
is involved directly or through its major suppliers in the 
use of child, forced, or sweatshop labor. 
 Outsourcing policy 
 Code of conduct for 
contractors 
 Monitoring of 
subcontractors and 
company suppliers 
 Involvement in labor rights 
violations of firm 
contractors 
Environment-
focused CSP 
Evaluates the company’s commitment towards the 
establishment of sound and appropriate environmental 
management systems, increasing efficiency in the use of 
resources and energy, and avoidance of harm to the 
environment. In assessing each company’s environmental 
record, consideration is given to specific elements that can 
be categorized under the following headings: 
 environmental management and reporting systems 
 the company’s record of compliance with applicable 
environmental laws and regulations 
 methods of use/extraction of natural resources 
 level of emissions of hazardous or toxic substances 
 level of emissions of substances that increase the 
threat of climate change 
 firm's impact on natural ecosystems 
 Resource consumption 
 Air emissions 
 Water and soil releases 
 Waste generation 
 Product impact 
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 measures to reduce the environmental impact of 
operations 
 the ecological impact of the company’s products 
Employee-
focused CSP  
Provides an overview of the company’s commitment 
towards social issues related to the company’s employees, 
and chiefly towards health and safety, diversity, and 
employee involvement. More specifically, the evaluation 
process examines whether the company has implemented 
policies and management systems to ensure the respect of 
core ILO conventions (forced and child labor, freedom of 
association, right to organize, discrimination). Issues such 
as health and safety of employees, training and 
employability employee ownership, and profit-sharing are 
also taken into account in the evaluation process. 
Particular attention is paid to the health and safety records 
relative to industry counterparts, the quality of relations 
with unionized workers, and legal actions related to 
discrimination in the workplace or employment equity 
issues. 
 Working conditions 
 Terms of employment 
 Working environment 
 Industrial relations 
 Employee 
involvement/participation 
Source: SiRi Research Framework (2006), SiRi internal documents. 
 
 
 
 
